10 of the Best Poems about Flowers

Interesting Literature

The best flower poems

Flowers are a perennial theme of poetry. Indeed, the word for a book of poems, ‘anthology’, even comes from the Greek for ‘flower’. Given how many classic poems have been written about flowers, it’s difficult to narrow it down to just ten of the best flowery poems – but that is nevertheless what we’ve tried to do below, offering a range of poems (comic, celebratory, romantic, carpe diem) from different periods of English literature.

George Herbert, ‘A Wreath’. In this poem by one of English literature’s greatest devotional poets, Herbert (1593-1633) creatively suggests the shape of a wreath through the rhyme scheme of his poem. The progression of its lines, and its rhyme scheme, both reflect the wreath’s circularity, a symbol of totality and connection. So the movement from one line to next forms a chain: the first line ends with talk…

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Διάβασα και σας συστήνω: Κ. Σωτηρίου, “Φωνές από χώμα” (Αθήνα: Πατάκης 2017)

Λωτοφάγοι

Το “διαβάζεται μονορούφι” θα πρέπει να καθιερωθεί ως τεχνικός όρος της λογοτεχνικής κριτικής προκειμένου για τα πεζογραφήματα της Κωνσταντίας Σωτηρίου.Δύο χρόνια μετά το δικαιότατα παινεμένο, βραβευμένο και θεατρικώς διασκευασμένο Η Αϊσέ πάει διακοπές(Αθήνα: Πατάκης 2015), η Σωτηρίου επιστρέφει με τις Φωνές από χώμα(Αθήνα: Πατάκης 2017). Η Αϊσέ προσέφερε ένα πανόραμα της κυπριακής ιστορίας κατά το δεύτερο μισό του 20ου αιώνα και την πρώτη δεκαετία του 21ου. Οι Φωνές επικεντρώνονται στα γεγονότα λίγων μόνο ημερών, στα ταραγμένα Χριστούγεννα του 1963 και στα συμβάντα που άναψαν το φυτίλι των διακοινοτικών ταραχών.

Δεκατρείς είναι συνολικά οι φωνές που ακούγονται στη νουβέλα: κοινές, μικρές, βιωματικές φωνές, όλες πλασμένες από χώμα: ανθρώπινες, μοιραίες, πεπερασμένες και φθαρτές φωνές — όλες κατ᾽ ακρίβεια πλασμένες από το ίδιο χώμα και καταδικασμένες να επιστρέψουν στο ίδιο χώμα: φωνές Ελλήνων και Τούρκων της Κύπρου, που από μάνα γίνεται γι᾽ αυτούς τάφος. Διαβάζουμε…

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Η Αμερικανική γεωστρατηγική στη Μέση Ανατολή

Προδρομικός

Το Αιγαίο ως γεωπολιτικός άξονας

Γράφει ο Νικόλαος Λ. Μωραίτης Ph.D.

Το άρθρο πραγματεύεται τους στρατηγικούς σχεδιασμούς των ΗΠΑ στην γειτονιά μας, αυτή την περιφέρεια που λέγεται Μέση Ανατολή, που οι εξελίξεις εκεί αγγίζουν τα εθνικά μας συμφέροντα και που αυτή η περιοχή έρχεται στο επίκεντρο των διεθνών εξελίξεων.

Η θέση της Ελλάδας σε αυτή την περιοχή, στην Ευρώπη, οι προοπτικές της στο μέλλον, η ασφάλειά της, τα συμφέροντά της δεν μπορούν να προσδιοριστούν χωρίς να μελετηθεί προσεχτικά μια εικόνα των εξελίξεων που διαμορφώνεται στην Μέση Ανατολή και στον Περσικό. Το πρόβλημα στο Αιγαίο είναι καθαρά γεωπολιτικής και επεκτατικής μορφής και η ευθύνη ανήκει εξ ολοκλήρου στη γειτονική Τουρκία.

Θα αναφερθούμε σε επιλογές των ΗΠΑ ως προς τους στόχους, της στρατηγικής στην περιοχή της Μέσης Ανατολής και Κεντρικής Ασίας, για να δούμε και ποιός είναι ο ρόλος της Τουρκίας.

Είναι γεγονός ότι οι ριζικές αλλαγές στην Κεντρική Ασία και Μέση…

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Yannis Ritsos-Romiosini//translated by Manolis Aligizakis

Ritsos_front large

ΡΩΜΙΟΣΥΝΗ

I

Αυτά τα δέντρα δε βολεύονται με λιγότερο ουρανό,
αυτὲς οι πέτρες δε βολεύονται κάτου απ᾿ τα ξένα βήματα,
αυτὰ τα πρόσωπα δε βολεύονται παρὰ μόνο στον ήλιο,
αυτὲς οι καρδιὲς δε βολεύονται παρὰ μόνο στο δίκιο.

Ετούτο το τοπίο είναι σκληρὸ σαν τη σιωπή,
σφίγγει στον κόρφο του τα πυρωμένα του λιθάρια,
σφίγγει στο φως τις ορφανὲς ελιές του και τ᾿ αμπέλια του,
σφίγγει τα δόντια. Δεν υπάρχει νερό. Μονάχα φως.
Ο δρόμος χάνεται στο φως κι ο ίσκιος της μάντρας είναι σίδερο.
Μαρμάρωσαν τα δέντρα, τα ποτάμια κ᾿ οι φωνὲς μες στον ασβέστη του ήλιου.
Η ρίζα σκοντάφτει στο μάρμαρο. Τα σκονισμένα σκοίνα.
Το μουλάρι κι ο βράχος. Λαχανιάζουν. Δεν υπάρχει νερό.
Όλοι διψάνε. Χρόνια τώρα. Όλοι μασάνε μία μπουκιὰ ουρανὸ πάνου απ᾿ την πίκρα τους.
Τα μάτια τους είναι κόκκινα απ᾿ την αγρύπνια,
μία βαθειὰ χαρακιὰ σφηνωμένη ανάμεσα στα φρύδια τους
σαν ένα κυπαρίσσι ανάμεσα σε δυο βουνὰ το λιόγερμα.

Το χέρι τους είναι κολλημένο στο ντουφέκι
το ντουφέκι είναι συνέχεια του χεριού τους
το χέρι τους είναι συνέχεια της ψυχής τους –
έχουν στα χείλια τους απάνου το θυμὸ
κ᾿ έχουνε τον καημὸ βαθιὰ-βαθιὰ στα μάτια τους
σαν ένα αστέρι σε μία γούβα αλάτι.

Όταν σφίγγουν το χέρι, ο ήλιος είναι βέβαιος για τον κόσμο
όταν χαμογελάνε, ένα μικρὸ χελιδόνι φεύγει μες απ᾿ τ᾿ άγρια γένια τους
όταν κοιμούνται, δώδεκα άστρα πέφτουν απ᾿ τις άδειες τσέπες τους
όταν σκοτώνονται, η ζωὴ τραβάει την ανηφόρα με σημαίες και με ταμπούρλα.

Τόσα χρόνια όλοι πεινάνε, όλοι διψάνε, όλοι σκοτώνονται
πολιορκημένοι απὸ στεριὰ και θάλασσα,
έφαγε η κάψα τα χωράφια τους κ᾿ η αρμύρα πότισε τα σπίτια τους
ο αγέρας έριξε τις πόρτες τους και τις λίγες πασχαλιὲς της πλατείας
απὸ τις τρύπες του πανωφοριού τους μπαινοβγαίνει ο θάνατος
η γλώσσα τους είναι στυφὴ σαν το κυπαρισσόμηλο
πέθαναν τα σκυλιά τους τυλιγμένα στον ίσκιο τους
η βροχὴ χτυπάει στα κόκκαλά τους.

Πάνου στα καραούλια πετρωμένοι καπνίζουν τη σβουνιὰ και τη νύχτα
βιγλίζοντας το μανιασμένο πέλαγο όπου βούλιαξε
το σπασμένο κατάρτι του φεγγαριού.

Τo ψωμὶ σώθηκε, τα βόλια σώθηκαν,
γεμίζουν τώρα τα κανόνια τους μόνο με την καρδιά τους.

Τόσα χρόνια πολιορκημένοι απὸ στεριὰ και θάλασσα
όλοι πεινάνε, όλοι σκοτώνονται και κανένας δεν πέθανε –
πάνου στα καραούλια λάμπουνε τα μάτια τους,
μία μεγάλη σημαία, μία μεγάλη φωτιὰ κατακόκκινη
και κάθε αυγὴ χιλιάδες περιστέρια φεύγουν απ᾿ τα χέρια τους

για τις τέσσερις πόρτες του ορίζοντα.

 

ROMIOSINI

I

These trees don’t take comfort in less sky

these rocks don’t take comfort under foreigners’

footsteps

these faces don’t take comfort but only

in the sun

these hearts don’t take comfort except in justice.

This landscape is merciless like silence

it hugs its fiery rocks tightly in its bosom

it hugs tightly in the sun its orphan olive trees

and grapevines

it clenches its teeth. There is no water. Only light.

The road vanishes in light and the shadow of the fence wall

is made of steel.

Trees rivers and voices turn to marble

in the sun’s whitewash.

The root stumbles on the marble. The dusty

bulrush.

The mule and the rock. They all pant. There is

no water.

They’ve all been thirsty for years and years. They all

chew one bite of sky over their bitterness.

Their eyes are red for lack of sleep

a deep wrinkle is wedged between their eyebrows

like a cypress between two mountains

at sundown

their hands are glued to their rifles

their rifles are extensions of their hands

their hands extensions of their souls –

they have anger on their lips

and grief deep within their eyes

like a star in a pothole of salt.

When they clasp a hand the sun is certain

of the world

when they smile a small swallow flies away from

their rough beards

when they sleep twelve stars fall from their

empty pockets

when they are killed life follows the uphill with

flags and drums.

For so many years they’ve all starved they’ve all thirsted

they’ve all been killed

besieged by land and sea

sweltering has devoured their fields and salinity has

drenched their homes

wind pushed down their doors and the few lilac shrubs

of the plaza

death goes in and out the holes of their overcoats

their tongues are astringent like cypress cones

their dogs died wrapped in their own shadows

the rain pounds on their bones.

Petrified on their battlements they smoke

the cow dung and during the night

they keep watch on the furious pelagos where

the broken mast of the moon sank.

The bread running out the ammunition spent

now they load their cannons with only their

hearts.

So many years besieged by land

and sea

they are all hungry they are all killed and yet

nobody died –

on their battlements their eyes shine

a large flag a great conflagration

totally red

and every dawn thousands of doves fly out

from their hands

to the four gates of the horizon

 

Yannis Ritsos-Poems, translated by Manolis Aligizakis, Libros Libertad, Vancouver, BC, 2011

 

Aristotle-Ethics II

aaristo001p1

The Mean

 

Now this discussion has shown that habit does make all the difference to our lives without being the only thing shaping those lives and without being the final form they take. The same discussion also points to a way to make some sense of one of the things that has always puzzled me most in the Ethics, the insistence that moral virtue is always in its own nature a mean condition. Quantitative relations are so far from any serious human situation that they would seem to be present only incidentally or metaphorically, but Aristotle says that “by its thing-hood and by the account that unfolds what it is for it to be, virtue is a mean.” (1107a, 7-8) This invites such hopeless shallowness as in the following sentences from a recent article in the journal Ancient Philosophy (Vol. 8, pp. 101-4): “To illustrate …0 marks the mean (e.g. Courage); …Cowardice is -3 while Rashness is 3…In our number language…’Always try to lower the absolute value of your vice.’ ” This scholar thinks achieving courage is like tuning in a radio station on an analog dial. Those who do not sink this low might think instead that Aristotle is praising a kind of mediocrity, like that found in those who used to go to college to get “gentlemen’s C’s.” But what sort of courage could be found in these timid souls, whose only aim in life is to blend so well into their social surroundings that virtue can never be chosen in preference to a fashionable vice? Aristotle points out twice that every moral virtue is an extreme (1107a, 8-9, 22-4), but he keeps that observation secondary to an over-riding sense in which it is a mean.

Could there be anything at all to the notion that we hone in on a virtue from two sides? There is a wonderful image of this sort of thing in the novel Nop’s Trials by Donald McCaig. The protagonist is not a human being, but a border collie named Nop. The author describes the way the dog has to find the balance point, the exact distance behind a herd of sheep from which he can drive the whole herd forward in a coherent mass. When the dog is too close, the sheep panic and run off in all directions; when he is too far back, the sheep ignore him, and turn in all directions to graze. While in motion, a good working dog keeps adjusting his pace to maintain the exact mean position that keeps the sheep stepping lively in the direction he determines. Now working border collies are brave, tireless, and determined. They have been documented as running more than a hundred miles in a day, and they love their work. There is no question that they display virtue, but it is not human virtue and not even of the same form. Some human activities do require the long sustained tension a sheep dog is always holding on to, an active state stretched to the limit, constantly and anxiously kept in balance. Running on a tightrope might capture the same flavor. But constantly maintained anxiety is not the kind of stable equilibrium Aristotle attributes to the virtuous human soul.

I think we may have stumbled on the way that human virtue is a mean when we found that habits were necessary in order to counteract other habits. This does accord with the things Aristotle says about straightening warped boards, aiming away from the worse extreme, and being on guard against the seductions of pleasure. (1109a, 30- b9) The habit of abstinence from bodily pleasure is at the opposite extreme from the childish habit of yielding to every immediate desire. Alone, either of them is a vice, according to Aristotle. The glutton, the drunkard, the person enslaved to every sexual impulse obviously cannot ever be happy, but the opposite extremes, which Aristotle groups together as a kind of numbness or denial of the senses (1107b, 8), miss the proper relation to bodily pleasure on the other side. It may seem that temperance in relation to food, say, depends merely on determining how many ounces of chocolate mousse to eat. Aristotle’s example of Milo the wrestler, who needs more food than the rest of us do to sustain him, seems to say this, but I think that misses the point. The example is given only to show that there is no single action that can be prescribed as right for every person and every circumstance, and it is not strictly analogous even to temperance with respect to food. What is at stake is not a correct quantity of food but a right relation to the pleasure that comes from eating.

Suppose you have carefully saved a bowl of chocolate mousse all day for your mid-evening snack, and just as you are ready to treat yourself, a friend arrives unexpectedly to visit. If you are a glutton, you might hide the mousse until the friend leaves, or gobble it down before you open the door. If you have the opposite vice, and have puritanically suppressed in yourself all indulgence in the pleasures of food, you probably won’t have chocolate mousse or any other treat to offer your visitor. If the state of your soul is in the mean in these matters, you are neither enslaved to nor shut out from the pleasure of eating treats, and can enhance the visit of a friend by sharing them. What you are sharing is incidentally the 6 ounces of chocolate mousse; the point is that you are sharing the pleasure, which is not found on any scale of measurement. If the pleasures of the body master you, or if you have broken their power only by rooting them out, you have missed out on the natural role that such pleasures can play in life. In the mean between those two states, you are free to notice possibilities that serve good ends, and to act on them.

It is worth repeating that the mean is not the 3 ounces of mousse on which you settled, since if two friends had come to visit you would have been willing to eat 2 ounces. That would not have been a division of the food but a multiplication of the pleasure. What is enlightening about the example is how readily and how nearly universally we all see that sharing the treat is the right thing to do. This is a matter of immediate perception, but it is perception of a special kind, not that of any one of the five senses, Aristotle says, but the sort by which we perceive that a triangle is the last kind of figure into which a polygon can be divided. (1142a, 28-30) This is thoughtful and imaginative perceiving, but it has to be perceived. The childish sort of habit clouds our sight, but the liberating counter-habit clears that sight. This is why Aristotle says that the person of moral stature, the spoudaios, is the one to whom things appear as they truly are. (1113a, 30-1) Once the earliest habits are neutralized, our desires are disentangled from the pressure for immediate gratification, we are calm enough to think, and most important, we can see what is in front of us in all its possibility. The mean state here is not a point on a dial that we need to fiddle up and down; it is a clearing in the midst of pleasures and pains that lets us judge what seems most truly pleasant and painful.

Achieving temperance toward bodily pleasures is, by this account, finding a mean, but it is not a simple question of adjusting a single varying condition toward the more or the less. The person who is always fighting the same battle, always struggling like the sheep dog to maintain the balance point between too much and too little indulgence, does not, according to Aristotle, have the virtue of temperance, but is at best selfrestrained or continent. In that case, the reasoning part of the soul is keeping the impulses reined in. But those impulses can slip the reins and go their own way, as parts of the body do in people with certain disorders of the nerves. (1102b, 14-22) Control in self-restrained people is an anxious, unstable equilibrium that will lapse whenever vigilance is relaxed. It is the old story of the conflict between the head and the emotions, never resolved but subject to truces. A soul with separate, self-contained rational and irrational parts could never become one undivided human being, since the parties would always believe they had divergent interests, and could at best compromise. The virtuous soul, on the contrary, blends all its parts in the act of choice.

This is arguably the best way to understand the active state of the soul that constitutes moral virtue and forms character. It is the condition in which all the powers of the soul are at work together, making it possible for action to engage the whole human being. The work of achieving character is a process of clearing away the obstacles that stand in the way of the full efficacy of the soul. Someone who is partial to food or drink, or to running away from trouble or to looking for trouble, is a partial human being. Let the whole power of the soul have its influence, and the choices that result will have the characteristic look that we call “courage” or “temperance” or simply “virtue.” Now this adjective “characteristic” comes from the Greek word charactÍr, which means the distinctive mark scratched or stamped on anything, and which is apparently never used in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the sense of character of which we are speaking, the word for which is Íthos, we see an outline of the human form itself. A person of character is someone you can count on, because there is a human nature in a deeper sense than that which refers to our early state of weakness. Someone with character has taken a stand in that fully mature nature, and cannot be moved all the way out of it.

But there is also such a thing as bad character, and this is what Aristotle means by vice, as distinct from bad habits or weakness. It is possible for someone with full responsibility and the free use of intellect to choose always to yield to bodily pleasure or to greed. Virtue is a mean, first because it can only emerge out of the stand-off between opposite habits, but second because it chooses to take its stand not in either of those habits but between them. In this middle region, thinking does come into play, but it is not correct to say that virtue takes its stand in principle; Aristotle makes clear that vice is a principled choice that following some extreme path toward or away from pleasure is right. (1146b, 22-3) Principles are wonderful things, but there are too many of them, and exclusive adherence to any one of them is always a vice.

In our earlier example, the true glutton would be someone who does not just have a bad habit of always indulging the desire for food, but someone who has chosen on principle that one ought always to yield to it. In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles argues just that, about food, drink, and sex. He is serious, even though he is young and still open to argument. But the only principled alternative he can conceive is the denial of the body, and the choice of a life fit only for stones or corpses. (492E) This is the way most attempts to be serious about right action go astray. What, for example, is the virtue of a seminar leader? Is it to ask appropriate questions but never state an opinion? Or is it to offer everything one has learned on the subject of discussion? What principle should rule?–that all learning must come from the learners, or that without prior instruction no useful learning can take place? Is there a hybrid principle? Or should one try to find the mid-way point between the opposite principles? Or is the virtue some third kind of thing altogether?

Just as habits of indulgence always stand opposed to habits of abstinence, so too does every principle of action have its opposite principle. If good habituation ensures that we are not swept away by our strongest impulses, and the exercise of intelligence ensures that we will see two worthy sides to every question about action, what governs the choice of the mean? Aristotle gives this answer: “such things are among particulars, and the judgment is in the act of sense-perception.” (1109b, 23-4) But this is the calmly energetic, thought-laden perception to which we referred earlier. The origin of virtuous action is neither intellect nor appetite, but is variously described as intellect through-and-through infused with appetite, or appetite wholly infused with thinking, or appetite and reason joined for the sake of something; this unitary source is called by Aristotle simply anthropos. (1139a, 34, b, S-7) But our thinking must contribute right reason (ho orthos logos) and our appetites must contribute rightdesire (hÍ orthÍ orexis) if the action is to have moral stature. (1114b, 29, 1139a, 24-6, 31-2) What makes them right can only be the something for the sake of which they unite, and this is what is said to be accessible only to sense perception. This brings us to the third word we need to think about.

Source: www.iep.utm.edu